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Trial-Absence of Judge.
It is reversible error for the judge, during the argument of the case
before the jury, to go out of the court-room to a private room where he
cannot hear the argument nor pass on objections made by the prisoner's
counsel to the statements of the State's attorney.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

John K. Thompson was indicted for assault with
intent to kill, and was convicted. During the argument
of the case before the jury, the trial judge left the courtroom and remained out of the court-room during the entire
closing argument of the State's attorney. The judge had
retired for the purpose of preparing his instructions to the
jury, but he could not, and the record shows, did not, hear
the argument to the jury.- Counsel for the defendant
repeatedly objected to the remarks of the State's attorney,
but as the judge was absent from the court-room and there
was no presiding judge present to pass upon the questions
raised, or attempted to be raised, they were never decided.
Upon these facts CRAIG, J., said: "The argument before
the jury is a part of the trial of a cause as well as the
introduction of evidence to prove the innocence or guilt of
a defendant, or any other fact at issue in the trial. If the
1 32 N. ]E. Rep., 968 (1893).
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presiding judge may leave a court-room and engage in
"other business during the argument before the jury, he
may upon the same ground leave while the evidence is
being introduced during the progress of the trial, at any
any other stage of the proceeding. . ...
Under the
law the defendant, who was on trial for a serious crimeone which deprived him of his liberty-had the right to the
presence of the presiding judge during the argument of
the case before the jury, and the absence of the judge was,,
in our opinion, an error of sufficient magnitude to ieverse
the judgment."
MISCONDUCT oF A JUDGU AS GROUND FOR N~w TRIAL.

The purity of the judiciary is the
cause by consent of counsel for the
perpetuation of order and equality.
defense. Neither accused nor his
When the bench becomes the obcounsel for him could consent that
iect of criticism and contempt, the the judge of the Eourt before whom
death warrant will be read to an inthe cause was being tried might be
stitution which the civilized world elsewhere employed in
other
recognizes to-day with awe and
official duties. It is no less error
admiration. To the honor and
than if he had been -in another
credit of the judiciary, be it said
county. Where the judge is enthat its decorum has been,. as a
gaged in trying causes, there is the
rule, worthy of its praise; but in- court, and he can hold no court
stances of misconduct, legal, if not
elsewhere by proxy at the same
wilful, may be noted which the time. . . . This court has delaw recognizes as culpable and
cided in two civil cases that a
affording sufficient ground for
member of the bar, even with the
granting a new trial.
consent'of the parties, cannot exAbsence of the Judge during ercise judicial power." See also
Trial.-The record in Meredith v.
Cobb v. People, 84 Ill., 511.
People, 84' IIL, 479, homicide,
PrivateCommunications between
shows that the judge of the Circuit Judge and Jury.-It is a well esCourt before whom the cause was
tablished and salutary rule, and
tried, during the argument before
one very essential to the proper
the jury was absent for nearly two and effectual administration ofjusdays from the court-room and emtice, that the instructions of the
ployed in the trial of other causes
judge to the jury should be openly
in an adjoining room, and his and publicly~imparted. The right
place upon the bench was occupied
of a suitor to have the trial of his
successively by two members of the cause conducted openly, with the
bar. Justice ScoTT in setting aside
opportunity to be present and to
the verdict said: "It is not ma- except to and review any unwarterial whether the judge of the ranted instruction or procedure, is
Circuit Court was absent from the a substantial one, and if any infraccourt-room during the trial of the tion of it occurs the burden rests

GROUND FOR
upon the party maintaining 'the
regularity of the proceedings to
show that the communication or
act or question could not have
tended to the injury of the defeated party. If it appears affirmatively and beyofid dispute that the
instructions, instead of being prejudicial to the party complaining
-were really favorable, to him and
could not have worked any injustice, or in any vay have affected
the result, or if the irregularity
has been cured by the waiver (see
Alexander v. Gardiner, 14 R. I., 15)
or assent of the party alleging it,
itis not a sufficient reason lor ordering a new trial; but it may be
stated generally that the party
moving for a reversal is not required to show affirmatively that
the communication tended to his
hurt, the principle underlying the
rule being that such communications are so dangerous and impolitic that it should be presumed conclusively that harm was done. The
source of the danger lies in the
secrecy attending the act. Graham and Waterman on New Trials,
Vol. II, p. 360, say: "The practice
of the courts addressing private
notes to the jury cannot be sufficiently condemned."
In Watertown Bank v. Mix, 51 N. Y., 559,
the judge answered somewhat
vaguely a written question relating
to the evidence sent to him by the
iury, by writing his answer beneath
and returning it, but without informing counsel. JOHNsON, C.,
said: "It is, in my opinion, better
and safer to adhere to the rule as
affirmed by the adjudged cases and
by what I understand to be the settled usage in this State, that there
ought to be no communication between the judge and jury after they
have gone from the bar to consider
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of their verdict, in relation to the
oral evidence or Iils instructions to
them, unless it take place openly
in court or with the express consent of the parties." In Sargent
v. Roberts, I Pick., 337, the Court
said: "We are all of the opinion,
after considering the question maturely, that no communication
whatever ought to take place between the judge and the jury after
the cause has been committed to
them by the charge" of the Court
unless in open court, and where
practicable in the presence of the
counsel in the case."
Wiggins v. Downer, 67 How. Pr.,
N. Y., 65, a leading case, reviews
the authorities. Here the jury returned to open court at the close of
the evening session, when neither
parties nor counsel were present.
and requested the Court to repeat
certain propositions, which was
granted. The attendance of counsel was impossibl.
Verdict sustained. See also Goldsmith v.
Solomons, 2 Groble, S. C., 296;
Rogers v." Moulthrop, 13 Wend.,
N. Y., 274.
A distinction has been drawn
between a written communication
to the jury involving law and one
involving fact. In Thayer v. Van
Vleet, 5 John., N. Y. iii, a justice's court jury while deliberating
sent for the justice, who entered
their room and answered a question of law: Held, no such misconduct as commended a new trial.
See also Allen v. Aldrich, 29 N. H.,
63; School Dist. vz. Bragdon; 23 N.
H., 517. And the judge may give
written instructions to the jury
after they have retired, at their request, upon questions of law, even
in the absence of counsel: Shapely
v'.White, 6 N. H., 172; Basset r,.
Salisbury Co., 28 N. H., 438. But
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* in Plunkett v. Appleton, 5 rHow.
Pr., N. Y. 469, a verdict was set
aside because the judge, without
the knowledge of codnsel, sent
written communications to the
jury answering questions of law
addressed to him by the jury. A
reversal was allowed in Bunn v.
Croul, io Johns., N. Y., 239, where
the question was one of fact and
not a matter of law. See also
Mahoney v. Decker, 18 Hun., N.
Y., 365. In Neil v. Abel, 24 Wend.,
N. Y., 185, the judge was reversed
because he permitted the jury,
without the consent of the parties,
to use his minutes sent for by them.
Similiter, State v. Alexander, 66
Mo., 148.
In Shapely -v. White, PARkER,
J., said: "The principle to be deduced from these cases seems to be
a sound one. If the jury, after an
adjournment, put a question. respecting the facts of the case to the
court, it will be irregular to -state
the evidence relating to it; but if
they desire instruction upon a
mere question of law, that may be
answered. It should undoubtedly
be*answered in such a way that the
parties may have an opportunity
to have it corrected if there is any
error in the answer, and in this
way all the rights of both parties
are secured as effectually as if the
answer was given in open court."
In Taylor v. Betsford, 13 Johns.,
N. Y., 487, the justice went into
the jury room and deliberated with
them privately and apart from the
parties and without their consent.
Judgment reversed. SeealsoBenson
v. Clark, r Con. (N. Y.), 258. The
Court, in Hobery v. State, 3 Minn.,
262, said: ' A judge has no more
right to communicate with a jury
after it has retired than iny other
person, and we must look upon his
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visit in this case in the same light
that we would view the entry of
any third person into the jury
room while the jury was in consultation." The Court, in Wiggins v.
Downer, 67 How. Pr., N. Y., 65,
said: "From these cases and others
of like character that might be
cited, dt is clear that a judge should
not privately communicate with
the jury, either by entering the
room where they are deliberating "
or by means of written communications. The principle upon which
thp rule rests is that such communications are so dangerous and
impolitic that they will be conclusively presumed to have influenced the jury improperly. The
source of the danger is the secret
nature of communication."
But
see Thayer V. Van Vleet, 5 Johns.,
N. Y., iii.
IntoxicationoftheJudge.-Such
culpable decorum is uiidoubtedly
ground for a new trial. Says the
court, in Repath v. Walker, i3
Col., io9: " It would be better to
submit questions in dispute to the
arbitration of chance than to the
decision of a tribunal which is not
thoroughly upright and scrupu-.
lously fair as between litigants;
and can it be said that an upright
judge, a scrupulously fair man, one
who appreciates the dignity of his
office, can impartially determine
the interests of litigants'and fairly'
administer the law when in a state
of intoxication. Such conduct on
the part of a judge is not only reprehensible, but is indeed criniinal."
Judicial Recognition of Scandal.
-In Rickabus v. Gott, 51 Mich.,
227, the trial judge permitted to be
admitted needless scandal and
gratuitous attacls on the character
of a party. Upon reversal the
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Supreme Court said: "There was
no color of excuse for the practice.
It was equally a violation of propriety and the rules of evidence.
It was not only hearsay, but irrelevant, and could have no other
object than to wound and disparage
the proponent. . . . The testimony had no legal connection with
the question that was being tried,
and tle end to which it was obviously directed is utterly indefensible. The duty of the trial judge
to repress needless scandal and
gratituitous attacks on character is
a very plain one, and good care
should be taken to discharge it
fully and faithfully."
Mfisconduct of Court toward the
Evidence.-In Belmore v. Caldwell,
2 Bibb., Ky., 76, the judge refused
counsel permission to argue a question of fact before the jury. Upon
reversal the Supreme Court said:
'-'
The right of appearing by counsel and arguing matters of fact involved in the cause is a right which
the Court ought not to have denied
to the party." Similiter Olds v.
Com., 3 Marsh., Ky., 467; Hunt
v. State, 49 Ga., 255.
Attitude offJudge-The manner
and demeanor of the judge which
indicates a bias and obviously influenced the jury will afford ground
for a new trial. In Wheeler v.
Wallace, 53 Mich., 355, the trial
judge apparently sanctioned an
abuse of cross-examination, the
purpose of which was to entrap a
witness into making inadverdent
statements; volunteered his own
notion of the purpose of a question;
reflected before the jury upon the
capacity and memory of counsel;
and stated as a fact,' when there
was doubt about it, that a witness
had sworn to a particular statement. ChiefJustice CooLEY, upon
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reversal, said: "It is very unusual
to have exception taken on writ of
error to the manner and deportment of the trial judge in the
conduct of the trial, and under
ordinary circumstances a court of
review would not scrutinize very
closely his methods when no error
in his rulings, was alleged. Still,
it is possible for a judge to deprive
a party of a fair trial, even without
intending to do so, by the manner
in which he conducts the case, and
by a plain exhibition to the jury of
his own opinions in respect to the
parties or to the case."
State v. Richards, 72 1o., 17, was
reversed by the higher court because the judge's charge was prejudicial to the defendant as tending
to impair his credibility as a witness when it was possible for the
jury to reconcile it with the evidence of other witnesses.
Remarks of Court to Counsel.It is misconduct, warranting a new
trial, for the Court to compliment
one attorney to the detriment of
the other, or to resort to language
which unjustljy casts a stigma upon
counsel, or where his remarks to
an attorney show an unfavorable
opinion toward either party to the
suit.
In McDuff v. Journal Co., 47 N.
W. Rep., 671, the Court said: "I
don't want to compliment Mr.
Pound (the plaintiff's attorney), but
I am well aware of the fact that
Mr. Pound knows how to try a law
suit." Judgment reversed. Upon
exceptions to the court's remarks
to counsel during trial and argument, Judge SHERWOOD, in setting
aside the verdict of Cronkhite v.
Dickerson, 51 Mich., 177, said: "It
is insisted by the defendant's counsel that these suggestions by the
Court were calculated to make an
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impression unfavorable to the defendant, upon the minds of thejury.
Of course, nothing of the kind was
intended by the court; still, we
think, the suggestions open to the
criticisms made by the defendant's
counsel, and it is impossible to tell
to what extent the defendant's
rights may have been prejudiced
by the remark. Certainly, the natural tendency was in that direcrion,
and in this there was error. Jurors
are very vigilant in scrutinizing all
that is said by the trial judge in the
progress of a cause before them,
and great care should be observed
that nothing is said which can, by
any possibility,'be construed to the
prejudice of either party. Courts
cannot be too circumspect in this
regard." See, also, People v. Hare,
57 Mich., 505; Mittel v. Chicago, 9
Ill. Ap., 534JudicialCoercionof Jury.-Language coming from the bench, obviously tending to coerce the jury
into agreement, affords ground for
a new trial. Any improper remark of the court in the presence
and hearing of the jury, liable to
influence that action is misconduct.
The jury, in Green v. Telfair, ii
How. Pr., N. Y., 260, after having
been absent several hours in consultation, returned into court, and
stated their inabiltty to agree. The
judge informed the jury that it was
very important that they should
agree upon a verdict; that the case
had excited considerable feeling,
which would be increased if they
should separate wlthout agreeing;
that no one juror should control
the result, or otherwise the verdict
would be the verdict of one man,
and not of the twelve; that both
parties had taken exceptions to decisions made during the progress of
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the trial, and it was necessary before these decisions could be reviewed, that there should be a verdict of some kind; that for five
years he had discharged but one
jury, because they were unable to
agree, and that he would return
Monday morning to receive their
verdict. A verdict was rendered
almost instantly. HARRIS, J., in
reversing the lower court said: "A
judge may also keep the jury to- gether as long as in his judgment
there is any reasonable prospect of
their being able to agree; but beyond this I do not think "heis at
libertyto go. An attempt to influence the jury by referring to the
time they are to be kept together,
or the inconvenience to which they
are to be subjected, in case they
shall be so pertinacious as to adhere
to their individual opinions, and
thus continue to disagree, cannot
be justified. A judge has no right
- to threaten or intimidate a jury in
order to affect their deliberations.
I think he has no right even to allude to his own purpose as to the
length of time they are to be kept
together. There should be nothing
in his intercourse with the jury
having the least appearance of"
duress or coercion.In Slater v. Mead, 53 How. Pr.,
57, the lower court said: "You
must agree upon a verdict, I cannot
discharge you until you agree upon
a verdict." The- Court of Appeal
declared that "these remarks of
the justice presiding at the trial
were such as would very probably
induce the jury to come to an agreement, from a desire to escape longer
confinemept. . . . The verdict
cannot be said to be the judgment
of the jury, acting "without restraint, andin the discharge of their
obligations, to render a true verdict
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according to the evidence, and,
therefore, it ought not to stand."
See, also, Phoenix Insurance Co. v.
Moog, 81 Ala., 335. The inferior
court was reversed in R. R. Co. v.
Jackson, 81 Ind., i9,for sending
word by the bailiff to the jury that
"if they do not agree to a verdict
I will keep them there until Saturday," that was to say four days.
The reversal in Fushman v. Mayor,
54 Ala., 263, was based on a remark
by the judge to the jury that the
proceeding "was a civil suit, but if
the jury considered the evidence
they would find it decidedly criminal." The higher court said "we
cannot shut our eyes to the fact that
juries . . . watch with anxiety
to gather from the court some
intimation as to what the judge
thinks should be their finding."
Upon the jury stating their inability to find a verdict, in State v.
Ladd, i La. An.; 27 r , thejudge said
that the case was one of peculiar
character, and that he "had reason
to believe from information received that some of the jury had
been approached and tampered
with previous to the trial." Held,
that such remarks had a tendency
to coerce the jury into a verdict,
from improper motives, and was
sufficient grounds for remanding
the case for a new trial.
State v. Bybee, 17 Kan., 462, is
an exhaustive case. The defence
was alibi. The court intimated to
a divided jury that a reflection
would be cast upon them if they
did not agree; that there should be
concession in matters of detail and
minor importance; that they should
bring their minds together, as an
apothecary mixes different ingredients and ascertains the product,
and that they need not hope to be
discharged for a long time. BROWN,

J., in a learned opinion said " the
general impression of these instructions is that the jury ought by
compromise and surrender of individual convictions, of necessity to
come to an agreement, and that a
failure to do so would be an imputation upon both jury and court.
No juror should be influenced to a verdict by fear of personal disgrace or pecuniary injury.
No juror should be induced to agree
to a verdict by a fear that a failure
to so agree would be regarded by
the public as reflecting upon either
his intelligence or his integrity.
Personal considerations should
never be permitted to influence his
conclusions, and the thought of
them should never be presented to
him as a motive for action. Nor
do we think the illustration given
by the learned court a happy one.
..
We are constrained to believe that he passed beyond the
line which should limit the counsel
and instructions of a court to a
jury that thereby the material
rights of the defendant were prejudiced."
In Spearman v. Wilson, 44 Ga.,
473, a judge threatened to carry a
juryinto another county, where he
was about to hold court, if they did
not agree. The Supreme Court set
aside the verdict.
C.J. JACKSON, in Physioe v. Shea,
75 Ga., 466, said: "The new trial
was properly granted (by the Superior Court) on the ground that the
court erred in his remarks to the
jury, in regard to allowing them
their meals only at their own expense, after they had been out all
night without supper or breakfast.
It operated as a threat to starve
such as had no money into findinga verdict, for in ten minutes, after
being hung all night, they agreed
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on a verdict. The old idea of starving juries to coerce a verdict has
passed away." See, also, Hancock
v. Blam, 3 Baxter (Tenn.), 33.
The circuit judge, in R. R. Co. v.
Barlow, 86 Tenn., 537, upon the
jury's report of disagreement, said,
that it seemed "to be a very difficult matter for juries at the present
term of the court to decide questions of-fact submitted to them ;"
that it seemed to the court that
"nearly every jfiry had returned
and said they could not agree;" that
they "ought to agree and decide
cases, for they had to be decided by
juries; " and that he had no idea of
discharging them, but would keep
them together on the case "during
the entire term, if it lasted three
weeks," "unless they sooner agreed
upon it. Held, reversible error.
In Wannak v. Mayor of Macon,
53 Ga., 163, the trial judge said:
"Why, gentlemen of the jury, I
saw that Christmas exhibition myself, and was alarmed, but I am not
a witness in this case, and was not
at the firing, and I know nothing
about how the fire occurred on
Cherry Street, nor intimate my
opinion;" and the judge further
expresses an opinion that certain
testimony was" of but little value."
WARREN, C. J., said thi remarks
of the court "were erroneous and
improper." Judgment reversed.
In 'charging the jury in Hair z.
Little, 28 Ala., 236, that they might
give exemplary damages if the trespass was accompanied with circumstances of aggravation, the judge
playfully remarked, in the way of
illustration, "such damages as
would teach the old gentleman not
to violate the Sabbath, nor injure
his health by riding in the night,
nor interfere with the rights of
others." CHELTON, C. J., said the

remark "was calculated to impress
them (the jury) with the belief that
the judge thought the facts such
as would require them to give exVerdict set
emplary damages."
aside. See, also, Moncallo v. State,
12 Tex. Ap., 171.
Bowman v. State, 19 Neb., 523,
was a peculiar case. The defendant,
when arraigned for a felony, moved
for a continuance, on the ground
of absence of witnesses, including
his father. Whereupon the judge,
in the presence of certain of the
regular panel of petit jurors, some
of whom afterwards sat in the trial
of the cause, said that the father
told him that he would have nothing to do with the defendant; that
the defendant had committed perjury, and that E"grand jury would
be called. upon to investigate the
same, CoBn, J., said, "It may be
granted that such declarations
or expressions of the court did
not cause the future juror to
form or express an opinion as to
the guilt or innocence of the accused ; but it did prevent him from
entering the jury box with his mind
a tabula rasa, so far as the guilt or
innocence of the prisoner was concerned, whether he was himself
aware of what had been written
Reversed and
thereon or not."
remanded.
In Taylor v. Jones, 2 Head
(Tenn.), 565,'the lower court made
the following remark: "There are
some cases in which I have been
sometimes, in case of hung juries,
almost been constrained to tell the
jury that it would be better for them
to find a wrong verdict than not to
agree at all, as any error we may
commit may be corrected by the
Supreme Court ."
The Supreme Court, per CARUTHURS, J,, said: "The effect of such

